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ABSTRACT: In Classical Athens, an immigrant who stayed longer than about a month was required to 
register a citizen as prostates and to commence paying the metoikion. So were freed slaves. A recent 




In Classical Athens, an immigrant who stayed longer than about a month was required to 
register a citizen as prostates and to commence paying the metoikion.1 Likewise, freed 
slaves were to register prostatai and pay the metoikion.2 A recent study of Athenian 
status groups treats these freeborn and freedman metics as distinct legal “subcategories of 
resident alien.”3 Athenian law, I argue, did not. 
*** 
 Harpokration defines metic with a pair of criteria (µὲν…δὲ); first, a metic is “one who 
changes residence from one city to another, and not briefly visiting as a foreigner but 
having established residence there.”4 This alone cannot have functioned as a prescriptive 
legal test.5 The second part is similarly descriptive: “And twelve drachmas each year used 
to be paid by them, which was called “metoikion.”” Aristophanes of Byzantium also 
focused on the twin criteria of domicile and taxation: “A metic is whenever a person, 
having come from a foreign (polis) takes up residence in the polis, paying a tax toward 
certain appointed uses of the city. Thus, for so many days he is called a visitor 
(παρεπίδηµος) and does not pay tax, but if he passes the fixed time, he becomes a metic 
thenceforth and liable to taxation (µέτοικος ἤδη γίνεται καὶ ὑποτελής).”6 The last clause 
                                                
1 P. Gauthier, Symbola: Les étrangers et la justice dans les cités grecques (Nancy 1972) 122 (month); 
D. Whitehead, Ideology of the Athenian Metic (Cambridge 1977) 9, 76 (month), 75-77 (metoikion), 89-92 
(prostates). 
2 Whitehead, Ideology of the Athenian Metic 16-17. 
3 D. Kamen, Status in Classical Athens (Princeton 2013) 43: “distinguished from each other not only 
legally but also (more significantly) socially.” 
4 Harp. s.v. µετοίκιον: µέτοικος µέν ἐστιν ὁ ἐξ ἑτέρας πόλεως µετοικῶν ἐν ἑτέρᾳ καὶ µὴ πρὸς ὀλίγον 
ὡς ξένος ἐπιδηµῶν, ἀλλὰ τὴν οἴκησιν αὐτόθι καταστησάµενος. ἐδίδοντο δὲ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον ἔτος 
δραχµαὶ ιβʹ , ὅπερ ὠνόµαστο µετοίκιον. 
5 A. Dimopoulou-Piliouni, “Apeleutheroi: Metics or Foreigners?” Dike 11 (2008) 27–50, 29-30, 
suggests, “Such a definition could evidently not apply to a freedman residing in the city of his former 
master. A fundamental difference between a metic and a manumitted slave appears to be that the first was 
the citizen of another city, who chose to leave his natal city and move and live permanently into another. A 
metic was a willingly expatriated foreigner, a free man making his living permanently abroad, one who had 
never lost his civic status or rights in his natal city. If a metic chose to return to his homeland, he would be 
there a citizen of full rights.” But such a literal test would have excluded political exiles, whose departure 
was unwilling, or war refugees, who may not have had a homeland to return to, or countless others who 
may not have come from a polis in the first place—say, Aetolians. 
6 Ar. Byz. 38 [Nauck]: Μέτοικος δέ ἐστιν ὁπόταν τις ἀπὸ ξένης ἐλθὼν ἐνοικῇ τῇ πόλει, τέλος τελῶν εἰς 
ἀποτεταγµένας τινὰς χρείας τῆς πόλεως· ἕως µὲν οὖν ποσῶν ἡµερῶν παρεπίδηµος καλεῖται καὶ ἀτελής 
ἐστιν, ἐὰν δὲ ὑπερβῇ τὸν ὡρισµένον χρόνον, µέτοικος ἤδη γίνεται καὶ ὑποτελής· παραπλησίως δὲ τούτῳ 
καὶ ὁ ἰσοτελής. 
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is telegraphic, sensible enough but legally imprecise. As Pollux put it, “a metic is one 
who pays the metoikion,”7 and according to the Suda one’s prostates assisted.8 Payment 
was a physical and bureaucratic act performed in the presence of others and written 
down.9 One could not “become” a metic automatically.  
 We find the same imprecision elsewhere. Harpokration defines aprostasiou as “a type 
of action against metics who do not register / have a prostates.”10 If one paid the 
metoikion through a prostates then anyone lacking such could not have paid the 
metoikion; such a person was not legally a metic. Also Pollux.11 Similarly, the Suda notes 
that the poletai sold off the assets of metics who had no prostatai.12 The author of the 
Ath.Pol. states that the polemarch heard cases of aprostasiou for metics,13 by which he 
can only have meant that the polemarch heard cases of aprostasiou for those who 
appeared to be metics but, in fact, may or may not have taken the necessary steps to 
become so: a prosecutor might establish that a resident non-citizen was entirely 
                                                
7 Pollux 3.55: µέτοικος ὁ τὸ µετοίκιον συντελῶν. 
8 Suda s.v. Ἀποστασίου: Ἀπροστασίου δέ· τῶν µετοίκων ἕκαστος προστάτην ἔχουσι κατὰ νόµον ἕνα 
τῶν ἀστῶν, καὶ δι’ αὐτοῦ τό τε µετοίκιον τίθεται κατὰ ἔτος καὶ τὰ ἄλλα διοικεῖται (Cf. aprostasiou: each of 
the metics has a prostates, one of the citizens by law, and through him he pays the metoikion each year and 
manages everything else). Also s.v. Νέµειν προστάτην: ἀντὶ τοῦ ἔχειν προστάτην· τῶν γὰρ µετοίκων 
ἕκαστος µετὰ προστάτου τῶν ἀστῶν τινος τὰ πράγµατα αὑτοῦ συνῴκει καὶ τὸ µετοίκιον κατετίθει. καὶ τὸ 
ἔχειν προστάτην καλεῖται νέµειν προστάτην (for “to have a prostates;” for, each of the metics, with a 
prostates, who is one of the astoi, used to jointly administer his own affairs and pay the metoikion. And to 
have a prostates is called “nemein prostaten”). Here, συνῴκει must be an error for συνῳκονόµει; 
Whitehead translates, “each of the metics [sc. in classical Athens] manages his own affairs in conjunction 
with a sponsor who is one of the citizens” (Suda Online, Adler nu,166: http://www.stoa.org/sol). A handful 
of passages in the orators (Lys. 31.9, Dem. 29.3, Dem. 57.55, texts quoted below) refer to a metic 
depositing (κατα/τίθηµι) metoikion, which may suggest payment in person (Whitehead, Ideology of the 
Athenian Metic 76), but none indicates active engagement by the prostates.  
9 At Dem. 25.57 (quoted below) an alleged violator was hauled to the poleterion and found there to 
have paid the metoikion; this must have involved consultation of records kept by the tax collector(s) or the 
poletai themselves. 
10 Harp. s.v. Ἀπροστασίου: εἶδος δίκης κατὰ τῶν προστάτην µὴ νεµόντων µετοίκων· ᾑρεῖτο γὰρ 
ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ τῶν πολιτῶν τινὰ προστησόµενον περὶ πάντων τῶν ἰδίων καὶ τῶν κοινῶν. Ὑπερείδης ἐν τῷ 
κατ’ Ἀρισταγόρας ἀπροστασίου βʹ  (… For each used to choose for himself one of the citizens to be his 
prostates concerning all his own and common affairs. [sc. An example is] Hypereides in his second speech 
against Aristagora for aprostasiou). 
11 Pollux Onom. 8.35: ἀποστασίου δὲ δίκη κατὰ τῶν ἀφισταµένων ἀπελευθέρων, ἀπροστασίου δὲ κατὰ 
τῶν οὐ νεµόντων προστάτην µετοίκων (apostasiou is an action against freedmen who depart, and 
aprostasiou [sc. is an action] against metics who do not register / have a prostates). 
12 Suda s.v. πωλητής: …ὑπέκειντο δὲ τοῖς Πωληταῖς καὶ ὅσοι τὸ διαγραφὲν ἀργύριον ἐν πολέµῳ µὴ 
εἰσέφερον, ἔτι καὶ οἱ ξενίας ἁλόντες καὶ ὁ µέτοικος καὶ προστάτην οὐκ ἔχων καὶ ὁ ἀποστασίου γραφείς· 
τούτων γὰρ τὰς οὐσίας πωλοῦντες παρεκατέβαλον εἰς τὸ δηµόσιον (also falling under the poletai were 
those who did not contribute the levied sum in wartime, and also those convicted of xenia, and the metic 
who did not have a prostates, and the one who was convicted of apostasiou). This last is an error for 
aprostasiou; see Suda Online, Adler pi,2159: http://www.stoa.org/sol, where Whitehead translates “metics 
who had failed to take a prostates and been convicted on that charge” and links (n3) to aprostasiou (Adler 
alpha,3703). 
13 Ath.Pol. 58.3 αὐτὸς δ’ εἰσάγει δίκας τάς τε τοῦ ἀπο[σ]τασίου καὶ ἀπροστασ[ί]ου καὶ κλήρων καὶ 
ἐπικλήρων τοῖς µετοίκοις. 
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delinquent and had never been a legal metic in the first place.14 Elsewhere, the Suda 
draws the legal distinction carefully (s.v. aprostasiou): “whenever someone, though 
seeming to be a metic (δοκῶν εἶναι µέτοικος), does not have a prostates or does not pay 
the metoikion or claims to be a citizen though he has been wrongly enrolled in the 
politeia, he who wishes brings suit against him, which is called ‘aprostasiou.’”15 An alien 
whose stay passed the prescribed limit, but who lacked a prostates and had not paid the 
metoikion, was not a metic. He was liable to become one and may well have seemed to be 
so. But to be and to seem were different legal facts. 
 If conversion to metic status was not automatic, becoming liable was. “[I]n the fourth 
century at least, foreigners arriving in Athens—whether intending to ‘immigrate’ or 
not—encountered an essentially pragmatic machinery: intentions apart, if they stayed for 
longer than a statutory (and fairly short) period the polis required them to become 
metics.”16 So shows the rider to the decree that honored Straton of Sidon, which added 
that Sidonians who were visiting Athens for the purpose of trade could not be made to 
pay metoikion, serve as choregos, or contribute eisphora, “provided that they reside in 
Sidon and are active citizens” there.17 Absent this protection, if these Sidonians stayed in 
Athens beyond the fixed time limit they would have had to become metics; presence 
beyond the time limit was otherwise sufficient to trigger liability, and claims of proper 
residence elsewhere would not have altered that fact. By freeing these Sidonians from 
having to pay the metoikion18 the decree accorded them “an artificially prolonged ‘life’ as 
xenoi, as parepidemountes free of financial obligation.”19 One who pays the metoikion is 
a metic; one who does not is not. These two inverse legal facts do not give us a definition 
of metic status, but rather a diagnostic for determining whether a person belongs to it. 
Demosthenes mentions the very same.20 We have seen already the other available test: 
whether the individual had / had registered (νέµειν) a prostates.21  
                                                
14 The same imprecision is often mirrored by moderns; on the Polemarch’s role in introducing graphai 
aprostasiou A. R. W. Harrison, The Law of Athens2 (London 1998) I 195, notes, “the defendant here was 
by definition a metic.” 
15 Suda s.v. Ἀποστασίου: Ἀπροστασίου δέ· τῶν µετοίκων ἕκαστος προστάτην ἔχουσι κατὰ νόµον ἕνα 
τῶν ἀστῶν, καὶ δι’ αὐτοῦ τό τε µετοίκιον τίθεται κατὰ ἔτος καὶ τὰ ἄλλα διοικεῖται. ὅταν οὖν τις δοκῶν εἶναι 
µέτοικος προστάτην µὴ ἔχῃ ἢ µὴ δῷ τὸ µετοίκιον ἢ ἀστὸς εἶναι φάσκῃ παρεγγεγραµµένος εἰς τὴν 
πολιτείαν, ὁ βουλόµενος δίκην εἰσάγει πρὸς αὐτὸν, ἥτις λέγεται ἀπροστασίου. 
16 Whitehead, Ideology of the Athenian Metic 8-10, quote at 10. 
17 IG II2 141.30-36: ὁπόσοι δ’ ἂν Σιδω|νίων οἰκντες ἐς Σιδῶνι καὶ πολι|τευόµενοι ἐπιδηµῶσιν κατ’ 
ἐµπορ|ίαν Ἀθήνησι, µὴ ἐξεῖναι αὐτὸς µετ|οίκιον πράττεσθαι µηδὲ χορηγὸν | µηδένα καταστῆσαι µηδ’ 
εἰσφορὰν | µηδεµίαν ἐπιγράφεν (but as many of the Sidonians as, while residing in Sidon and exercising 
civic rights [there], visit Athens for trade, it shall not be possible to exact the metoikion from them nor to 
appoint any as choregos nor to register [them] for any eisphora). 
18 And choregia, or eisphora, to which only sufficiently wealthy metics were liable. 
19 Whitehead, Ideology of the Athenian Metic 14. 
20 Dem. 25.57: λαβὼν αὐτὸς αὐτοχειρίᾳ πρὸς τὸ πωλητήριον τοῦ µετοικίου ἀπήγαγεν· καὶ εἰ µὴ 
κείµενον αὐτῇ τὸ µετοίκιον ἔτυχεν, ἐπέπρατ’ ἂν διὰ τοῦτον, ᾧ τῆς σωτηρίας αὐτὴ αἰτία ἐγεγόνει (…seizing 
her himself, with his own hands, he hauled her off to the poleterion for the metoikion, and if the metoikion 
had not happened to be on record for her, she would have been sold, owing to this man to whom she had 
been the very cause of salvation); with less detail and more indignation, Dem. 57.54-55:  ἀλλὰ µὴν ὁ πατὴρ 
αὐτὸς ζῶν ὀµόσας τὸν νόµιµον τοῖς φράτερσιν ὅρκον εἰσήγαγέν µε, ἀστὸν ἐξ ἀστῆς ἐγγυητῆς αὑτῷ 
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 Thus, strictly speaking, we possess no ancient definition of a metic. Rather we have a 
definition of the event that triggered liability to the metic tax: legal residence, defined as 
presence beyond the statutory limit. And we have a diagnostic for identifying whether an 
alien is a metic: whether s/he has a prostates and has paid the metoikion. Moreover, if 
demes kept registers of metics, as has been suggested, then another indicator may have 
been available as well.22 Even so, when an outraged Euboulides asserts his citizenship, he 
does not ask, “In what deme am I registered as a metic?!” but rather, “Where have I paid 
metoikion?!”23 The Sidonians were said to be freed not from “deme registration,” but 
from taxation. To be a metic was to pay.24 
                                                                                                                                            
γεγενηµένον εἰδώς, καὶ ταῦτα µεµαρτύρηται. εἶτ’ ἐγὼ ξένος; ποῦ µετοίκιον καταθείς; ἢ τίς τῶν ἐµῶν 
πώποτε; (But in fact my father himself, when he was alive, having sworn the customary oath introduced me 
to the phraters, since he knew that I had been born a citizen to a citizen mother lawfully married to him, 
and these things have been introduced as evidence. So I am an alien then? Having paid metoikion where? 
Or who among my own ever has?). Aeschines 1.119 attempts to foreclose an argument that Demosthenes 
will, he says, make: that to discover whether Timarchos was a prostitute one should simply consult the 
telones. 
21 Suda s.v. Ἀποστασίου, also s.v. Νέµειν προστάτην (both quoted above); Harp. s.v. Ἀπροστασίου: 
εἶδος δίκης κατὰ τῶν προστάτην µὴ νεµόντων µετοίκων; Poll. Onom. 3.56: κατὰ δὲ τῶν οὐ τελούντων τὸ 
µετοίκιον ἢ προστάτην µὴ νεµόντων ἀπροστασίου δίκη. Scholars tend to translate this use of νέµειν as “to 
register” (see LSJ III.3), but the Suda treats it as a synonym for ἔχειν: s.v. Νέµειν προστάτην: ἀντὶ τοῦ ἔχειν 
προστάτην … τὸ ἔχειν προστάτην καλεῖται νέµειν προστάτην; s.v. Ἀποστασίου: προστάτην ἔχουσι … 
προστάτην µὴ ἔχῃ; s.v. πωλητής: προστάτην οὐκ ἔχων. And where the verb appears in the active voice with 
this middle force its clear tendency is toward “have” (LSJ s.v. III). Only Harpokration refers to “inscribing” 
a prostates (s.v. Ἀποστασίου: ἕτερον ἐπιγράφωνται προστάτην). It is unknown whether this inscription—if 
factual—occurred during some discrete registration of the prostates, or of the metic, or whether it simply 
accompanied the metic’s payment of the metoikion. In any case, we know nothing concrete about any 
formal registration of prostatai. This is partly a fact of our near total ignorance of any process by which 
metics themselves were registered, independent, that is, of their payment of metoikion (more below). 
22 Whitehead, Ideology of the Athenian Metic 72-75, esp.75: “The actual procedure of enrolment thus 
remains obscure. … There may have been an obligation upon individuals, having passed the ‘specified 
time’—or, before its introduction, having decided to stay—to go to the demarch and declare themselves. … 
Alternatively they were perhaps required to do so on arrival.” Also 77: “There surely were registers of 
metics in their demes, but also, I suggest, at some administrative centre where the revenue was assessed in 
the first place—the poleterion itself, or the polemarch's office: they would be based on reports from the 
demes, and they (rather than the deme lists) would be wherein payment was recorded. But this suggestion 
obviously should not be pressed.” Central administration is inferred in part from Dem. 25.57. See also 
Whitehead 1986: 81-85. Fifth-century prostatai are thought to have facilitated deme-enrollment for the 
metics whom they sponsored: Gauthier, Symbola 126-136; Whitehead, Ideology of the Athenian Metic 91. 
Pollux Onom. 3.57 (ἀδιάτακτοι δὲ καλοῦνται οἱ µὴ ἐγγεγραµµένοι εἰς τοὺς µετοίκους δέον, ἢ µὴ τελοῦντες 
τὸ µετοίκιον, ἢ τὴν σκάφην µὴ φέροντες) scarcely tells of a registration process independent of the 
recording of metoikion payment. Σ Ar. Birds 1669 and Σ Ar. Frogs 410, both adduced by M. Clerc, Les 
métèques Athéniens: étude sur la condition legale, la situation morale et le rôle social et économique des 
étrangers domicilés à Athènes (Thèse, Paris 1893) 249-250, do not show deme registration. 
23 Dem. 57.55: εἶτ’ ἐγὼ ξένος; ποῦ µετοίκιον καταθείς; 
24 S. C. Todd, The Shape of Athenian Law (Oxford 1993) 197, notes that the pairing of prostates and 
payment of metoikion were such a common stand-in for µετοικεῖν that the orators “can use it to describe 
Athenians residing as metics in other poleis.” See Lys. 31.9; Dem. 29.3; Lyc. 1.21.  
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 Now, Harpokration observes that freed slaves also paid the metoikion.25 Apparently, 
some hold that manumission at Athens entailed automatic conversion to metic status.26 
Such was impossible. A slaveowner had the power to convert a slave into a free non-
citizen, via formal witnessed speech act, just as a kyrios and groom could change a 
woman’s marital status. But, even leaving aside the possible requirement of deme 
registration, legal metic status was contingent on payment of the metoikion. There was no 
way to effect this automatically. Dimopoulou-Piliouni (2008) has argued that upon 
manumission a slave became a free alien and later may or may not have become a metic. 
This is undoubtedly correct.27 In observing that freed slaves paid the metoikion 
Harpokration was simply using the same sort of telegraphic expression that we saw 
above. He meant, I urge, that freed slaves who stayed long enough to trigger liability, 
were to pay just as immigrants did. Or perhaps the underlying legal fact was that 
manumission itself was the triggering event, so that freedmen became liable upon their 
release from servitude. Either way, this was a useful clarification, for the bulk of metics 
will have been immigrants. 
 It is sometimes emphasized that while freeborn metics paid the metoikion, freedmen 
paid an additional triobol, “maybe to the telones.”28 We know nothing about this fee, 
except that Pollux and Hesychius thought that it was part of the metoikion, presumably to 
be paid by all metics, the former indicating that it was paid to the grammateus (which, we 
do not know).29 If Pollux and Hesychius are right, and the triobol was paid by all metics, 
                                                
25 Harp. s.v. Μετοίκιον: ὅτι δὲ καὶ οἱ δοῦλοι ἀφεθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν δεσποτῶν ἐτέλουν τὸ µετοίκιον ἄλλοι 
τε τῶν κωµικῶν δεδηλώκασι καὶ Ἀριστοµένης (Aristomenes and other comic poets have shown that also 
slaves, after being freed by their masters, used to pay the metoikion). 
26 R. Zelnick-Abramovitz, Not Wholly Free: The Concept of Manumission and the Status of 
Mannumitted Slaves in the Ancient Greek World (Leiden and Boston 2005) 251: “The prevalent view is 
that manumitted slaves automatically assumed metic status;” Kamen, Status in Classical Athens 43: “It is 
unfortunately unclear to us whether freed slaves became metics (in the broad sense) automatically after 
being released from remaining obligations to their former master, or whether this was a separate 
registration process.” Dimopoulou-Piliouni, Dike 11 (2008) 30: “The predominant view is that manumitted 
slaves staying in Athens could automatically register as metics. Authors identifying apeleutheroi to metics 
in Athens often proceed by analogy: as metics are the one category of resident aliens of Athens about 
which we have the most information in the sources, it is considered only natural that apeleutheroi 
(identified as non citizens permanently living in the city) should either fit in the same group, or share with 
them the same disabilities. But, the information of the sources assimilating apeleutheroi to metics is far 
from being conclusive. In fact, there is not one single straightforward indication that apeleutheroi in Athens 
were automatically considered and registered as metics.” 
27 But Dimopoulou-Piliouni, Dike 11 (2008) 34-35, suggests also that since the Old Oligarch 1.10 
shows contempt for slaves, metics, and freedmen, and since Plato Leg. 915a treats metics and freedmen as 
different groups in his imaginary polity, and since Aristotle Pol. 1277b observes that freedmen are neither 
metics nor xenoi, “we can conclude that apeleutheroi are often referred to as a distinct social group, thus 
challenging the frequent assumption that manumitted slaves automatically enrolled among metics.” But the 
existence of distinct social categories tells us nothing about legal and administrative realities. 
28 Harp. s.v. µετοίκιον: Μένανδρος δ’ ἐν Ἀνατιθεµένῃ καὶ ἐν Διδύµαις πρὸς ταῖς ιβʹ  δραχµαῖς καὶ 
τριώβολόν φησι τούτους τελεῖν, ἴσως τῷ τελώνῃ. Kamen, Status in Classical Athens 44; eadem 
“Reconsidering the status of khôris oikountes,” Dike 14 (2011) 43–53, 47; Dimopoulou-Piliouni, Dike 11 
(2008) 31-32. 
29 Pollux 3.55: µέτοικος ὁ τὸ µετοίκιον συντελῶν· τοῦτο δ’ ἦν ιβʹ  τῷ δηµοσίῳ δραχµαὶ καὶ τῷ 
γραµµατεῖ τριώβολον. Hesychius s.v. µετοίκιον: τέλος οὕτως ἐκαλεῖτο, ὃ ἐτίθεσαν [ἐν] τῇ πόλει, δραχµὰς 
δώδεκα· τῷ δὲ τελώνῃ τριώβολον. 
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then perhaps it was a one-time or annual filing fee of some sort? All liable aliens, 
whether immigrants or freedmen, were required to pay the metoikion and this generated a 
considerable paper trail, some version of which could apparently be consulted at the 
poleterion.30 Perhaps administrative costs were offset by the collection of a small fee. If 
Harpokration is right and the triobol was paid by freedmen alone, then it would be 
compatible with a fee associated with manumission per se and strictly unrelated to the 
metic tax, though it might be collected—say, for convenience—when the metic tax was 
paid. This would be especially sensible if the triggering event for freed slaves was not 
duration of stay but emancipation itself. The collection of a small fee would be 
compatible with that, mundane, plausible,31 and perhaps analogous to practice 
elsewhere.32  
 Thus, as far as conventional and functional definitions were concerned, a metic was a 
metic. A non-citizen who was domiciled in Athens became liable. In all cases the 
triggering event that established domicile was the lapse of a fixed stretch of time, and in 
the case of freedmen it may have been emancipation itself. But as far as the sources 
indicate, liability was liability, regardless of how it was reached. To be a metic was to 
have experienced a triggering event, (perhaps to have registered with a deme) to have / 
have registered a prostates, and to have paid the metoikion. Definitionally, there is no 
indication that Athenian law was cognizant of multiple categories of metic. 
*** 
 We find the same in judicial and administrative practice. The Ath.Pol. notes that the 
Polemarch “introduces for metics cases for apostasiou and aprostasiou and inheritance 
and epikleroi; and otherwise as many things as the archon introduces for the citizens, the 
polemarch introduces for the metics.”33 Apostasiou was a private action available to 
manumittors whose former slaves “departed from them” or registered others as prostatai. 
Conviction resulted in a return to slavery, acquittal in freedom thenceforth.34 Aprostasiou 
                                                
30 See Dem. 25.57. The poletai’s filing responsibilities for farmed taxes alone were substantial: 
Ath.Pol. 47.2-3. We do not hear that they had a grammateus. But if they maintained record of individual 
payments (derived from the records of tax-collectors, deme registers, or whatever) then theirs was a 
considerable archival undertaking. 
31 More so, I urge, than “serv[ing] the symbolic role of marking freed slaves as “other”” (Kamen, Dike 
14 [2011] 47). 
32 R. Zelnick-Abramovitz, Taxing Freedom in Thessalian Manumission Inscriptions (Leiden and 
Boston 2013). 
33 Ath.Pol. 58.3: αὐτὸς δ’ εἰσάγει δίκας τάς τε τοῦ ἀπο[σ]τασίου καὶ ἀπροστασ[ί]ου καὶ κλήρων καὶ 
ἐπικλήρων τοῖς µετοίκοις, καὶ τἆλλ’ ὅσα τοῖς πολίταις ὁ ἄρχων, ταῦτα τοῖς µετοίκοις ὁ πολέµαρχος. 
Perhaps emend αὐτὸς to οὗτος: P. J. Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia2 
(Oxford 1993) ad loc. p.656. 
34 Harp. s.v. Ἀποστασίου: δίκη τίς ἐστι κατὰ τῶν ἀπελευθερωθέντων δεδοµένη τοῖς ἀπελευθερώσασιν, 
ἐὰν ἀφιστῶνταί τε ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ἢ ἕτερον ἐπιγράφωνται προστάτην, καὶ ἃ κελεύουσιν οἱ νόµοι µὴ ποιῶσιν. 
καὶ τοὺς µὲν ἁλόντας δεῖ δούλους εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ νικήσαντας τελέως ἤδη ἐλευθέρους. πολλάκις δ’ ἐστὶ παρὰ 
τοῖς ῥήτορσι, παρὰ τῷ Λυσίᾳ ἐν τῷ πρὸς Ἀριστόδηµον καὶ Ὑπερείδῃ ἐν τῷ κατὰ Δηµητρίας ἀποστασίου 
(There is an action granted against freedmen to those who freed them, if they depart from them or register 
another as prostates, and if they do not do what the laws bid; and those who are convicted must become 
slaves, while those who win [the case] shall be free thenceforth, with finality. Occurs often in the orators, in 
Lysias in the speech against Aristodemos and in Hyperides in the speech against Demetria for apostasiou). 
On a common view, freedmen were by default bound in a state of semi-liberty; see Zelnick-Abramovitz, 
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was a public action, available to anyone,35 against metics (or those liable to become so) 
who did not have a prostates at all, failed to pay the metoikion, or (according to the Suda) 
falsely claimed citizenship.36 Conviction meant sale into slavery.37 So, the dike 
apostasiou could be brought by manumittors alone against their former slaves. The 
graphe aprostasiou is thought to have applied strictly to freeborn metics.38 This cannot be 
right. 
 It is stressed that an immigrant could choose his own prostates, whereas a freedman 
was required to name his manumittor.39 The latter is not exactly true. First, the rule, as 
described, was framed not as a constraint on freedmen, but as a privilege of manumittors, 
to whom the dike apostasiou was granted (δίκη … δεδοµένη τοῖς ἀπελευθερώσασιν). 
Now, there is no indication that the rights, responsibilities, or qualifications of a prostates 
were in any way shaped by the prior status of the alien who named him; thus, when 
Harpokration indicated that prostatai were selected from among citizens he meant that all 
prostatai were, regardless of their registrants’ prior legal condition.40 This means that a 
freedman whose manumittor was himself a non-citizen cannot have been subject to a 
                                                                                                                                            
Not Wholly Free; Kamen, Status in Classical Athens 32-43. Thus, it is thought, victors in these cases 
became “fully free.” But that very phrase presumes the intelligibility of “half-free.” Athens was a place in 
which an important difference between liberty and servitude was liability to torture; to what, then, could the 
half-free have been liable? J. D. Sosin, “Manumission with Paramone: Conditional Freedom?” submitted 
MS (2014): http://hdl.handle.net/10161/8993, argues that the freedman’s semi-liberty is a modern invention. 
In the context, the plain meaning of τελέως, I urge is that the court ruling was to be final and would estop 
all future claims that a freedman was in fact a slave. The victors were not to be “fully free,” but free with 
finality. Cf. τελεία ψῆφος at Aes. Suppl. 739 and Soph. Ant. 632. 
35 E. A. Meyer, Metics and the Athenian Phialai-Inscriptions: A Study in Athenian Epigraphy and Law 
[=Historia Einzelschriften 208] (Wiesbaden 2009) 44-47. 
36 Harp. s.v. Ἀπροστασίου; Suda s.v. Ἀποστασίου; Poll. Onom. 3.56  (texts quoted above). Meyer, 
Metics and the Athenian Phialai-Inscriptions 43-47. 
37 So Dem. 25.57: ταύτην τὴν ἄνθρωπον, τὴν τοιαῦτ’ εὐεργετήσασαν αὐτόν, ὡς πολὺς παρ’ ὑµῖν ἔπνει 
καὶ λαµπρός, µεµφοµένην τι καὶ τούτων ὑποµιµνῄσκουσαν καὶ ἀξιοῦσαν εὖ παθεῖν τὸ µὲν πρῶτον ῥαπίσας 
καὶ ἀπειλήσας ἀπέπεµψεν ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκίας, ὡς δ’ οὐκ ἐπαύεθ’ ἡ ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ γυναίου πρᾶγµ’ ἐποίει καὶ 
πρὸς τοὺς γνωρίµους προσιοῦσ’ ἐνεκάλει, λαβὼν αὐτὸς αὐτοχειρίᾳ πρὸς τὸ πωλητήριον τοῦ µετοικίου 
ἀπήγαγεν· καὶ εἰ µὴ κείµενον αὐτῇ τὸ µετοίκιον ἔτυχεν, ἐπέπρατ’ ἂν διὰ τοῦτον, ᾧ τῆς σωτηρίας αὐτὴ αἰτία 
ἐγεγόνει (…seizing her himself, with his own hands, he hauled her off to the poleterion for the metoikion, 
and if the metoikion had not happened to be on record for her, she would have been sold, owing to this man 
to whom she had been the very cause of salvation). Suda s.v. πωλητής (quoted above) may imply the same.  
38 So Kamen, Status in Classical Athens 44, translates Ath.Pol. 58.3, δίκας τάς τε τοῦ ἀπο[σ]τασίου καὶ 
ἀπροστασ[ί]ου καὶ κλήρων καὶ ἐπικλήρων τοῖς µετοίκοις, “Charges of [freedmen] acting without their 
prostatês [patron][i.e., dikai apostasiou] or of [freeborn metics] lacking a prostates [i.e. graphai 
aprostasiou].” See also, e.g. Todd, The Shape of Athenian Law 111: “in a graphê aprostasiou, the 
defendant is an immigrant metic.” 
39 E.g. Kamen, Dike 14 (2011) 47-48. Harrison, The Law of Athens2 I 185: “the freedman had to have 
his former master as προστάτης, unlike other metics, who were free to choose.” 
40 Harp. s.v. Ἀπροστασίου, quoted above. Also s.v. Προστάτης: οἱ τῶν µετοίκων Ἀθήνησι 
προεστηκότες προστάται ἐκαλοῦντο· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ἦν ἕκαστον τῶν µετοίκων πολίτην τινὰ Ἀθηναῖον 
νέµειν προστάτην· Ὑπερείδης ἐν τῷ κατ’ Ἀρισταγόρας. µέµνηται καὶ Μένανδρος ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς Περινθίας 
(those who have become guardians for metics at Athens were called “prostatai.” For it was necessary that 
each of the metics register an Athenian citizen as a prostates). Harpokration does not speak of two distinct 
types of prostatai. 
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requirement to name his manumittor as prostates. He had to name someone else, an act 
for which his manumittor had no standing to sue. Only a citizen manumittor enjoyed the 
right to sue a freedman who named someone else as prostates.41 This makes sense. Any 
rule that sought to constrain a freedman to name his manumittor as prostates would have 
failed to cover those who were freed by non-citizens. This would have been a gaping 
loophole. On the other hand, a rule that was meant to safeguard a privilege of citizen 
slaveowners will have had no reason to extend the same privilege to metic slaveowners 
and none at all to compel citizen slaveowners to act on it.42 A citizen manumittor, if he so 
wished, must have been free to let a manumitted slave choose another prostates. If 
Pasion’s former owners were citizens,43 and if his prostates was Peithodoros of 
Acharnai,44 they may have done just this. No rule, I urge, required a manumitted slave to 
name his manumittor as prostates.45 Instead, citizen manumittors enjoyed the right of first 
refusal and, where violated, the remedy of dike apostasiou.46 Metic manumittors did not. 
This difference from the procedure that applied to immigrant metics must be an artefact 
of Athenian law on manumission and not, so far as we can tell, any law on metics. 
Furthermore, if graphai aprostasiou could be brought only against freeborn metics then if 
a slave was manumitted by a metic and then took up residence in Athens without having 
a prostates or paying the metoikion, he could be sued neither by his manumittor nor by 
anyone else.47 Athenian laws tended not to so shabbily designed. The graphe 
aprostasiou, then, must have applied to all resident non-citizens who were required to 
become metics but failed to have / register a prostates and/or pay the metoikion, all 
metics who were otherwise in good standing but omitted at some point to pay the 
                                                
41 A fact neatly applied in a recent redefinition of the so-called Attic Manumissions: Meyer, Metics and 
the Athenian Phialai-Inscriptions 24-25. 
42 There is no reason to think that “a metic manumittor may have been required to transfer that right to 
a citizen” (Zelnick-Abramovitz, Not Wholly Free 254). If the right was construed as a citizen slaveowner’s 
entitlement, a non-citizen manumittor had no right to transfer. Athens’s interest lay in the registration of the 
domiciled non-citizen, not in the invention of legal conditions where they had not existed before.  
43 E. E. Cohen, Athenian Economy and Society: A Banking Perspective (Princeton 1992) 70n44. 
44 Zelnick-Abramovitz, Not Wholly Free 252, 324; J. K. Davies, Athenian Propertied Families, 600-
300 B.C. (Oxford 1971) 430. 
45 Dimopoulou-Piliouni, Dike 11 (2008) 33, notes that “In Athens, as in other cities, upon the 
apeleutheroi weighted specific obligations, such as the obligation to choose as προστάτης their former 
master (who could have been a metic) and the obligation to perform the duties imposed by him.” The only 
cause to think that metics could be prostatai is the belief that the so-called Attic Manumissions attest 
metics ‘prosecuting’ disobedient freedmen under sham dikai apostasiou; but if Meyer, Metics and the 
Athenian Phialai-Inscriptions, is correct, then this oddity—long unexplained—vanishes. The only duty 
owed by freedmen to their manumittors, so far as we know, is not to “depart” from them and to do what the 
laws bid (Harp. s.v. ἀποστασίου). Harrison, The Law of Athens2 I 185, suggests that the former may 
indicate no more than compliance with the terms laid down at manumission; we have no idea what the 
latter entailed. There is no evidence that freedmen were subject to anything like the detailed regulations 
found at Pl. Leg. 915a-c, which include mandatory minimum visitation, regulation of marriage, wealth 
caps, and limits on duration of residence.  
46 It is prima facie more likely that Athenians wrote a simple and clean law protecting citizen property-
owners than that they wrote a law that was meant to burden a low-status group but was so poorly conceived 
that it excepted the lowliest members of that very group. 
47 He may still have been susceptible to graphe xenias. 
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metoikion,48 and all non-Athenians who wrongly claimed citizenship, whether they were 
born free or made so.49 
 Thus, when it came to the formal mechanism by which a metic’s legal status was 
reified—a high-stakes procedure whose failure could result in enslavement—there was 
one kind of process, one kind of prostates,50 one kind of action for neglect, one kind of 
metic. Moreover, when a metic claimed standing in court pursuant to the status that this 
process secured, Athenian law was blind to his former legal state. 
*** 
 We have seen so far that, in terms of ‘definitions’ of metic status, liability for 
acquiring it, legal tests for diagnosing whether it exists, tax-liability owing to it, judicial 
access pursuant to it, and accountability for failure to conform to its terms, Athenian law 
knew only one form of metic. Add to this the fact that no extant source indicates that 
freedman metics were differently subject to military service, differently in/eligible to 
participate in public religion, differently liable to other financial obligations.51 This 
leaves very little scope for legal differentiation of the two purported sub-types of metics. 
If not here, then where? 
 Property rights, it is alleged. We know of no constraint on the freedom of immigrant 
metics to dispose of property. By contrast, “freedmen, unlike free-born metics, had 
limited license in bequeathing their estates,”52 for the property of freedman metics who 
died childless went to their manumittors.53 But here again, nothing indicates that this was 
a product or feature of legislation on metics per se. Rather, it was a mundane necessity of 
orderly inheritance. In law, a slave had no biological family, which meant that freedmen 
lacked legal ascendents and siblings. Thus, absent the above provision, the property of a 
freedman who died intestate and without children could pass automatically to no one at 
all.54 This rule avoided that hassle, but inasmuch as it harmed no one’s interests (applying 
only to dead metics who lacked legal heirs) it cannot be called a limitation in any real 
                                                
48 Or replace a prostates who had died, moved, or otherwise withdrawn? We hear nothing of such a 
possibility. 
49 Dimopoulou-Piliouni, Dike 11 (2008) 34, notes that “In strict terms of law, the very fact that 
specific, non identical legal actions could be brought against metics and apeleutheroi as defendants, 
concerning their status and legal obligations, the first being a γραφὴ, a public prosecution which could be 
brought by any citizen, the second a δίκη, a private prosecution which could be brought only by the former 
master, is a clear sign that the two groups were perceived differently by the city laws.” But this does not 
hold. These were different actions for different transgressions, and, in fact, there is no reason to think that 
all metics were not subject aprostasiou. 
50 Zelnick-Abramovitz, Not Wholly Free 248-251, puzzles at length over Harpokration’s reference (s.v. 
ἀποστασίου) to registration of epistatai, rather than prostatai (248n130): “ἐὰν ἀφιστῶνταί τε ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ἢ 
ἕτερον ἐπιγράφωνται ἐπιστάτην.” But Harpokration wrote προστάτην; ἐπιστάτην is a modern error, perhaps 
owing here to mistaken homoiopropheron. Or perhaps it was copied from Harrison, The Law of Athens2 I 
185n3, which also has the same error. 
51 Whitehead, Ideology of the Athenian Metic 82-96 (military), 86-89 (religion), 77-82 (financial 
obligations). 
52 Kamen, Status in Classical Athens 45. 
53 Kamen, Status in Classical Athens 48. 
54 Harrison, The Law of Athens2 I 148-149: “It is an open question whether a childless freedman was 
permitted to dispose of his property by will. This may have depended on the terms of his manumission.” 
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sense. We cannot say even whether the rule was a feature of law on manumission. For all 
we know, it originated in a law on inheritance. Either way, immigrant metics posed no 
such legal conundrum concerning inheritance and so Athenian laws on succession did not 
apply to their assets in this way. The difference tells us something about inheritance law 
and nothing about metic law. 
 It is noted also that the legal status of a freedman metic was more fragile and insecure 
than that of a freeborn metic. The former, it is suggested, “was subject to reversion to 
slavery, something that clearly differentiated him from the status of an unconditionally 
free man such as a metic.”55 But the Suda states clearly that aprostasiou could be brought 
against anyone who seemed to be a metic but had no prostates or did not pay the metic 
tax or claimed to be a citizen in spite of improper enrollment (s.v. Ἀποστασίου quoted 
above). If convicted, the accused faced “the defining danger of metic status,” 
enslavement.56  Now, the life of a freedman was more precarious than that of a freeborn 
person, but that fact was enshrined in law and practice around manumission and slavery 
and likely had nothing to do with any law on metics. By analogy, female metics were on 
less firm ground than male, but as far as we can tell this was a feature of systemic gender 
inequality rather than a product of legislation on metics per se. The relative insecurity of 
freedman metics may have been a fact, and even a legal fact, but not one created by 
legislation on metics. 
 Finally, “Pollux attributes to Demosthenes the mention of special laws in Athens 
regarding manumitted slaves, the ἐξελευθερικοί καὶ ἀπελευθερικοὶ νόµοι, confirming the 
existence of two different groups of manumitted slaves, both regulated by a different set 
of laws by the polis.”57 This brief observation of Pollux is almost always quoted in 
isolation and runs, “καὶ Δηµοσθένης φησὶν ἐξελευθερικοὺς νόµους καὶ ἀπελευθερικοὺς 
νόµους.” These eight words say nothing of two types of manumitted slaves or two types 
of laws. Neither does a fuller quotation (Pollux Onom. 3.83): 
 
ὁ δὲ τῆς δουλείας ἀφειµένος τῶν δούλων ἀπελεύθερος καὶ ἐξελεύθερος, ἀπηλευθερωµένος. καὶ 
ἀπελευθερῶσαι ἀπελευθερωθῆναι, καὶ ἀπελευθέρωσις καὶ ἀπελευθερία. καὶ Δηµοσθένης φησὶν 
ἐξελευθερικοὺς νόµους καὶ ἀπελευθερικοὺς νόµους.  
 
He among slaves who is released from slavery (is called) “apeleutheros” and “exeleutheros,” [i.e.] 
“having been freed.” Also “to free” and “to be freed,” and “apeleutherosis” and “apeleutheria.” And 
Demosthenes mentions exeleutheric laws and apeleutheric laws. 
 
Nothing here shows that Pollux thought that apeleutheros and exeleutheros denoted 
different legal facts. On the contrary, he explains the two terms with a single participle 
(ἀπηλευθερωµένος), as if to indicate that he thought of them as synonyms. Didymos 
did.58 Nothing here tells that that Demosthenes didn’t think the same; that he wasn’t 
                                                
55 Dimopoulou-Piliouni, Dike 11 (2008) 34. 
56 Meyer, Metics and the Athenian Phialai-Inscriptions 28-31, quote at 30. 
57 Dimopoulou-Piliouni, Dike 11 (2008) 36. These laws’ “very existence indicates that freedmen were 
considered, at least for some purposes a juridical category,” i.e. distinct from metics: Kamen, Dike 14 
(2011) 48. 
58 Did. Gramm. De dubiis apud Platonem lectionibus 251-252 [Miller]: Ἀπελεύθερον δὲ νῦν οὐ πάνυ τι 
λεγόντων, ἀλλ’ ἐξελεύθερον, καὶ νόµου καλουµένου τινὸς ἐξελευθερικοῦ, περὶ τῶν ἐξελευθέρων Πλάτων 
ἐν τοῖς Νόµοις (915a) γράφει· “ἀπαιτῶ (read ἀγήτω) δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀπελεύθερον, ἐάν τις µὴ θεραπεύειν (read 
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using two terms, perhaps in two passages, to describe the same law(s).59 According to 
one recent argument, apeleutheroi were conditionally freed freedmen, bound in a 
juridical state of half-liberty / half-slavery to their former masters under an arrangement 
akin to what was called (at Athens only after the late fourth century) paramone, while 
exeleutheroi were unconditionally free freedmen.60 This demands a lot from the very few 
extant references to exeleuther-, many of which, it has now been argued, have nothing to 
do with freedmen at all.61 Moreover, according to one recent argument the legal state of 
half-liberty so often associated with Greek manumission, is a modern invention and never 
existed.62 
 Moreover, the fact that these “laws specifically target[ed] freedmen” and “were 
irrelevant to freeborn metics”63 shows little. Laws about the process of manumission or 
the rights of freedmen need not say much or anything about conversion to metic status, 
for there could be no certainty that all freedmen would become such. Neaira was freed in 
Corinth and promptly left.64 There is no reason to think that the same could not happen at 
Athens. Thus, the mere fact that laws, about which we know practically nothing, may 
have specifically addressed freedmen does not mean that Athenian law accorded different 
rights and obligations to freedman metics and freeborn metics or that it recognized the 
two as distinct subcategories of the wider legal class. My son and I are both citizens of 
the United States. I was born so; he was naturalized. He was subject to laws that 
“specifically target” naturalizing citizens. These are irrelevant to me. And yet, except for 
eligibility to hold the Presidency, from which he is barred owing to the defined terms of 
                                                                                                                                            
θεραπεύῃ) τοὺς ἀπελευθερώσαντας ἢ µὴ ἱκανῶς. Θεραπεία δὲ φοιτᾶν τρὶς τοῦ µηνὸς τὸν ἀπελευθερώσαντα 
(read ἀπελευθερωθέντα) πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀπελευθερώσαντος ἑστίαν.” 
59 Compare the variety of expressions used to denote similar, and even identical, forms of real security 
in fourth-century Athens: E. M. Harris, Democracy and the Rule of Law in Classical Athens: Essays on 
Law, Society, and Politics (Cambridge 2006) 163-206, 207-239. 
60 Zelnick-Abramovitz, Not Wholly Free 99-126. 
61 Meyer Metics and the Athenian Phialai-Inscriptions. One inventive grammarian thought that the 
words indicated release from debt-bondage (exeleutheros), as distinct from manumission (apeletheros). 
Ptol. Gramm., Περὶ διαφορᾶς λέξεων p. 394 [H. Heylbut, “Ptolemaeus Περὶ διαφορᾶς λέξεων,” Hermes 22 
(1887) 388-410] ἐξελεύθερος καὶ ἀπελεύθερος διαφέρει· ἐξελευθέρους µὲν λέγουσι τοὺς διὰ χρέος 
προσθέτους τοῖς δανισταῖς γινοµένους, ἔπειτα ἀπολυθέντας, ἀπελευθέρους δὲ συνήθως; p. 407: 
ἀπελεύθερος µέν ἐστιν ὁ ἐκ δούλου ἠλευθερωµένος, ἐξελεύθερος δὲ ὁ γενόµενος διὰ χρέα προσήλυτος ἢ 
κατ’ ἄλλην τινὰ αἰτίαν δουλεύσας εἶτα ἐλευθερωθείς· ἤδη µέντοι καὶ ἀδιαφόρως χρῶνται τοῖς ὀνόµασιν; p. 
407: ἀπελεύθερος µέν ἐστιν ὁ ἐκ δούλου ἠλευθερωµένος, ἐξελεύθερος δὲ ὁ γενόµενος διὰ χρέα 
προσήλυτος ἢ κατ’ ἄλλην τινὰ αἰτίαν δουλεύσας εἶτα ἐλευθερωθείς· ἤδη µέντοι καὶ ἀδιαφόρως χρῶνται 
τοῖς ὀνόµασιν. Zelnick-Abramovitz, Not Wholly Free 103: “This explanation cannot hold for cities 
(including Athens) where debt-bondage had been abolished at a relatively early date.” Not so at Athens: see 
Harris, Democracy and the Rule of Law in Classical Athens 149-169. There is no supporting evidence for 
such lexical disambiguation in the fourth century, and it looks like an attempt to fit later, Roman, legal 
practice to a classical Greek reference. For contractual paramone, in which a free person was prepaid for 
services to be rendered, thereby becoming a temporary debt-bondsman to the creditor; B. Adams, 
Paramoné und verwandte Texte; Studien zum Dienstvertrag im Rechte der Papyri (Berlin 1964); A. E. 
Samuel, “The Role of Paramone Clauses in Ancient Documents,” JJP 15 (1965) 221–311, 297–306. 
62 Sosin, “Manumission with Paramone,” http://hdl.handle.net/10161/8993. 
63 Kamen, Status in Classical Athens 45. 
64 [Dem.] 59.30-32. 
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that office rather than a formally enacted disability of the naturalized, we enjoy the same 
rights, privileges, and obligations that attach to the franchise. We are both citizens, full 
stop. The existence of the “freedmen laws” to which Demosthenes apparently referred, in 
no way suggests that Athenian law recognized two categories of metic. 
 Those very few places in which the legal constraints on freedman metics differed 
from those to which immigrant metics were subject appear to have originated in other 
domains of law (inheritance, slavery and manumission) and to have had no derivation 
from law on metics per se.  
*** 
 It would be great to discover what the Athenians’ “freedmen laws” required. But it 
would be a surprise to learn that they created, affirmed, or recognized two different legal 
categories of metic. When it came to the definition, acquisition, and verfication of legal 
status, access to the courts, liability to taxation, liability to military participation, 
in/elibility to participate in public religion, property rights, and susceptibility to punitive 
enslavement, Athenian law knew but one type of metic, the one who had a prostates and 
paid the tax. 
